



Do 90 percent of terrorist groups last less than a year? 
Updating the conventional wisdom 
 
Version accepted at Terrorism and Political Violence 
July 2017 
 








Abstract: Prominent scholars criticize terrorism research for lacking sufficient empirical 
testing of arguments. Interestingly, one of the most widely-cited estimates in terrorism 
studies has not been evaluated using the many data sources now available. Rapoport’s 1992 
claim, that perhaps 90 percent of terrorist groups last less than one year, has been described 
as part of the conventional wisdom. This estimate is frequently used to justify studies of 
terrorist group longevity, a substantial line of research in recent years. Is the estimate 
accurate? Scholars increasingly publish data sets of terrorist organizations, but no one has 
analyzed them collectively to see if the 90 percent claim holds up. This article examines the 
eight largest global data sets of terrorist group longevity, covering 1968-2013. The samples 
vary considerably, but the percent of groups that do not survive beyond their first year in 
these relevant data sets is between 25-74 percent. Across all data sets, on average about 50 
percent of terrorist organizations do not make it past their first year. There is some variation 
depending on group motivations, consistent with Rapoport’s “wave” theory. However, 
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Terrorism research suffers from a number of issues, including, as Crenshaw argues, 
a “need for integrative and cumulative theory.”1 A related matter is that terrorism studies 
has lagged behind other areas of research in its use of hard data, whether descriptive or 
inferential.2 Sageman contends that terrorism research contains an “explosion of 
speculations with little empirical grounding.”3 The conventional wisdom on terrorism has 
included claims that, when subjected to substantial and repeated empirical testing, have not 
always found support. For example, the relationship between democracy and terrorism is 
not as clear as it once seemed.4 Additionally, the supposed lack of a relationship between 
mental illness and terrorism is not so simple – when it comes to lone-actor terrorism.5 At 
least one claim in the conventional wisdom has never been the focus of empirical testing, 
and that is the motivation for this manuscript.  
One of the most widely-cited statistics in terrorism studies is that 90 percent of 
terrorist groups last less than one year. This estimate was first made by David Rapoport in a 
1992 encyclopedia article, before global data sets of terrorist groups existed.6 It has been 
cited by a host of other important terrorism scholars such as Byman, Cronin, Hoffman, 
Sandler, Silke, and Stern.7 It has been described as “the conventional wisdom” regarding 
terrorist group longevity.8 Other scholars refer to it as the “oft-quoted phrase,” “oft-cited 
guestimate,” or “well-known conjecture.”9 The statistic is frequently used to justify 
research on terrorist group longevity, a substantial line of work in recent years. However, to 
what extent is this statement accurate? Since the 1990s, a number of data sets of terrorist 
organizations have been published, but no one has collectively analyzed them to see to 
what extent the 90 percent claim holds up.10 
The question of terrorist group longevity, and specific data about average survival 
time, is important for a number of reasons. If so many groups are indeed flashes in the pan, 
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instead of studying specific groups it might make more sense to study different units of 
analysis, such as broader social movements from which groups emerge, lone wolves and 
small cells, or entire conflicts instead of particular organizations. Regarding policy, if 
terrorist groups usually do not have substantial lifespans, then policies such as leadership 
decapitation might often be unnecessary.  
The rest of this manuscript proceeds as follows. First, the context of the 90 percent 
quote is discussed, as well as its repetition in later studies. Second, eight of the largest 
global data sets of terrorist groups are examined, to see what percent of groups do not 
survive past their first year. The samples of terrorist groups vary considerably. However, 
the percent of groups that do not survive beyond their first year, in these relevant global 
sets of terrorist groups, is between 25-74 percent. The average first-year failure rate across 
the data sets is about 50 percent. This suggests terrorist groups are more durable than the 
conventional wisdom indicates. Some of Rapoport’s related claims do find support, such as 
the notion that left-wing or “third wave” groups are especially failure-prone, and the idea 
that many groups that survive through their first year do not make it to their tenth. The 
conclusion offers suggestions for future research. 
 
A famous statistic in the terrorism literature 
Rapoport’s statement about longevity in the 1992 encyclopedia article is worth 
quoting in its entirety:  
 
Modern terrorist organizations, in contrast to their ancient counterparts, do 
not survive long. Perhaps as many as 90 percent last less than a year. Nearly 




 The statement was then repeated in a variety of terrorism studies, including research 
by some of the most visible scholars. Bruce Hoffman states, in his classic book Inside 
Terrorism, “David Rapoport, for example, estimates that the life expectancy of 90 percent 
of terrorist organizations is less than a year, and that nearly half the ones that make it that 
far cease to exist within a decade.”12 Similarly, Audrey Cronin repeats the statement in her 
International Security article on terrorist group longevity.13 It is noteworthy that Cronin 
also suggests that the claim “needs to be updated.” These are a few examples, but searches 
of academic articles and books reveal that dozens of other studies repeat Rapoport’s 
claim.14 
 Interestingly, some studies that mention the 90 percent statistic cite secondary 
sources instead of the original Rapoport piece.15 A few articles mention the statistic without 
any citation. These kinds of issues of course happen with citations, but they point to the 
widespread “conventional wisdom” nature of this figure. They also illustrate how citation 
counts of Rapoport’s encyclopedia entry probably underestimate its true impact. It is 
difficult to know precisely how many times the 1992 encyclopedia article has been cited. 
Books and book sections are notoriously undercounted by academic search engines.  
 Few if any terrorism statistics are more widely cited than Rapoport’s 90 percent 
estimate. Other possibilities include the 9/11 Commission’s evaluation that the Sept. 11, 
2001, attacks cost around $500,000, which was repeated in many popular and academic 
publications.16 Pape’s comment that suicide attacks kill 12 times more people than non-
suicide attacks has also been repeated widely.17 Rapoport’s estimate appears to be 
comparable with these commonly-cited claims.   
 
Beyond the original “90 percent” estimate 
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 Beyond Rapoport’s 90 percent estimate, there are several related claims that are also 
important to recognize. First, as is indicated in the full quote above, Rapoport also states 
that of those groups that survive the first year, almost 50 percent will not survive to 10 
years. This claim is difficult to evaluate because it is about the survival patterns of the 
approximately 10 percent of groups that complete their first year, when – as this manuscript 
will show – that 10 percent figure does not seem to be accurate. Given the debatable 
premise, there is uncertainty about what sample of groups to analyze to see if they make it 
to 10 years. Additionally, to know which groups survived up to 10 years, one would need to 
only analyze groups founded at least 9 years before the end of the sample. This would 
substantially truncate samples. However, the 10-year survival claim is briefly examined 
below in case some readers are interested.  
Second, Rapoport’s claim about 90 percent of groups not surviving past one year 
appeared, as noted, in his 1992 encyclopedia article. However, in the 2004 edition, 
Rapoport estimates that 90 percent of “third-wave” (leftist) groups do not survive a year. 
The updated version of the encyclopedia article does not make a claim about terrorist 
groups generally, only leftist groups. This update has not been noticed by most of the 
scholars who cite Rapoport’s 1992 article. The empirical section also briefly evaluates this 
claim about third-wave groups. Finally, in the updated 2004 version of Rapoport’s article, 
he also mentions that “ethnic groups are the most durable because their constituencies are 
the most stable.”18  Rapoport also argues that religious groups “ultimately may be much 
more durable,” compared to earlier waves.19 The empirical section considers these claims 
as well. However, most of this manuscript focuses on the 1992 estimate, about terrorist 




 To evaluate the 90 percent estimate, this section examines the largest global data 
sets of terrorist organizations. This is the best way to test assertions about terrorist groups 
in general. The data sets analyzed are those that sought to gather information about as many 
terrorist groups around the world as possible – essentially, the “universe” of terrorist 
groups. Beyond these data sources, other data sets have restricted their sample to only 
groups that, for example, have carried out a certain minimum number of attacks.20 As a 
result, shorter-lived groups are likely to be excluded. If these more selective databases were 
included, this would bias results toward finding a very low percentage of groups that last 
less than a year. Table 1 provides summary information about the databases analyzed. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
The primary databases analyzed, in order of year of publication, are Jones and 
Libicki’s data on 648 groups; Vittori’s random sample of 100 groups (from a larger sample 
of 897); Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer’s study of 1,414 groups; Dugan’s analysis of 2,103 
groups; Gaibulloev and Sandler’s information on 586 groups; My own data on 633 groups; 
Young and Dugan’s study of 2,223 organizations, and Miller’s analysis of 2,437 
organizations.21  
Jones and Libicki sought to gather information on every terrorist group in the world 
between 1968 and 2006, primarily using the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident database. 
This appears to be the most influential database of terrorist groups, cited hundreds of times 
according to Google Scholar. Additionally, other scholars have used the Jones and Libicki 
data for their own analyses of group longevity.22 Vittori sought to gather information on 
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every terrorist group between 1968 and 2007. She used the Terrorism Knowledge Base 
(TKB), which relied on RAND-MIPT data and the American Terrorism Study Indictment 
Database. This produced 897 groups, but given challenges with coding information for so 
many groups, she focused on a random sample of 100 organizations. 
Blomberg et al. use the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events 
(ITERATE) data to gather information on groups that have carried out at least one 
transnational attack between 1968-2007. Transnational attacks can imply the group 
travelling to another country, but more often refer to local attacks on “international” targets 
such as a consulate or visiting dignitary. Therefore, we should be careful about applying 
inferences drawn from the Blomberg et al. transnational terrorist group data to “terrorist 
groups” more broadly. However, many groups, even groups we might think of 
fundamentally “domestic,” carry out at least one transnational attack, so the data set 
includes many important groups.  
Dugan analyzed a data set of all 2,013 organizations associated with attacks in the 
GTD, 1970-2007. She notes that most of the groups, 1,493, were active less than a year. 
Gaibulloev and Sandler also published a data set of terrorist groups from 1970-2007, 
drawing on RAND and Jones and Libicki’s data. They end up with 586 groups, fewer than 
other researchers using similar sources. They indicate that this is because RAND 
sometimes includes different variations of group’s name as separate groups, and Gaibulloev 
and Sandler remove these repeat “groups.”23   
My own data set of 633 groups covered 1987-2005, using information from a 
number of sources. Asal and Rethemeyer’s group data, based on the TKB, was used for 
1998-2005.24 For earlier years, the TKB, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) attack data, 
as well as Lexis-Nexis searches, were used. Young and Dugan’s data is similar to Dugan’s, 
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but with some refinements. They used GTD data and identify 2,223 terrorist groups, a few 
more than Dugan originally reported. Miller’s data is also GTD-based, and the largest 
sample used, with 2,437 groups between 1970 and 2013. Overall, the Dugan, Young and 
Dugan, and Miller data sets can be considered GTD data, but minor differences result from 
distinct cleaning and coding decisions. There is no official “GTD terrorist group” data set.  
Table 1 shows, for each of the data sets described above, what percent of terrorist 
groups do not survive beyond their first year. None of the databases provides support for 
the idea that 90 percent of groups do not survive past their first year. The percent of groups 
that do not make it past year one are between 25-74 percent. The average value across the 
eight data sets is 52 percent. This is considerably lower than Rapoport’s estimate. There is 
substantial variation in the samples in terms of their first-year failure rates. In Dugan’s 
sample, 74 percent of groups last a year or less. However, there are also several data sets 
where the rate is less than 30 percent. Instead of relying on one database, the 52 percent 
average is a rough, but helpful, indication of first-year failure patterns among major 
terrorist group data collections.   
Why is there such substantial variation in longevity patterns across data sets? Any 
effort to gather data on terrorism, or terrorist groups, is fraught with challenges. 
Researchers must decide what is “terrorism,” then what is a “terrorist group.” Specific 
groups must be identified, as opposed to multiple aliases for the same group, lone-actors 
that claim their attacks with the name of a group. Additionally, decisions must be made 
about whether a group is a faction or cell of a larger group, or if it is its own group. 
Researchers also have to decide what year a group actually “started” and “ended,” which is 
more complicated than some readers might realize. In general, there are difficulties with 
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finding information about clandestine groups. As a result, it makes some sense that 
different researchers would build databases with such divergent results.  
However, it is interesting that the three data sets with the lowest first-year failure 
rates all use RAND data. By contrast, the three data sets with the highest first-year failure 
rates (Dugan, Miller, and Young and Dugan) use GTD data. Some reasons for variation 
based on data source are discussed below, in particular the size of the GTD. Different data 
sources will produce distinct results, and researchers should keep this in mind.  
Sample size seems to be related to longevity. The data sets by Jones and Libicki, 
Gaibulloev and Sandler, and Phillips include fewer terrorist organizations than the others. It 
is probably not a coincidence that the data sets with fewer terrorist groups also find longer 
duration. Narrower definitions of “terrorist group,” and the related smaller samples, are 
usually associated with longer group duration.25 In general, smaller samples might be 
missing some legitimate groups, and it seems probable that small, short-lived groups would 
be the most likely to be overlooked. If the Jones and Libicki, Gaibulloev and Sandler, and 
Phillips data are removed from this analysis, the average percent of first-year failure rises to 
68 percent. This is high, but still rather far from Rapoport’s 90 percent estimate.  
A flip side of these sample selection concerns, however, is that it is possible that the 
larger terrorist group databases include some non-groups, such as aliases, or groups better 
thought of as a cell within a larger group. Additionally, the GTD, the source for the three 
largest data sets, includes attacks by some groups that are not commonly thought of as 
“terrorist groups,” such as drug-trafficking organizations.26 These issues raise questions 
about whether bigger is necessarily better with terrorist group databases. However, it is 
difficult to know which database is the most accurate reflection of reality, and therefore 
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looking at multiple sources is helpful to try to understand patterns of terrorist group 
survival – or any other organizational characteristics. 
 
Additional claims: 10-year survival and third-wave groups 
Do nearly half of all groups that survive past their first year end before their tenth 
year? This claim is more difficult to evaluate, for reasons discussed above. However, 
analysis of the available data suggests there is some support for this claim. For example, in 
the Jones and Libicki and Phillips data sets, more than half of the groups that survived their 
first year did not make it to their tenth (62 and 58 percent, respectively). The percentage is 
higher in Dugan’s GTD data, where 78 percent of the groups living past their first year did 
not last until their tenth year. However, in the Gaibulloev and Sandler data, only 35 percent 
of the groups surviving their first year go out of business before turning 10. Overall, then, 
there is some support for Rapoport’s less-quoted assertion that a about half of terrorist 
groups surviving past a year do not make it until their tenth birthday.      
Regarding Rapoport’s 2004 claim that 90 percent of third-wave groups did not last a 
year, the extant data sources do not provide support for such a high percentage. None of the 
data sets explicitly codes third-wave groups, but four have a motivation or ideology 
variable that codes some groups as left-wing or leftist. The data sets also include other 
categories, such as ethnic (also referred to as “nationalist”) and religious groups, which 
Rapoport argued should be especially resilient.   
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
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Figure 1 shows the first-year failure rates for left-wing groups vs. other types of 
group based on their motivations. In the four samples with such data, left-wing groups are 
indeed more likely to fail in their first year than other group types. In the Jones and Libicki 
data, left-wing groups have a 29 percent first-year failure rate, while the rates are 27 and 18 
percent respectively for religious and ethnic groups. The Vittori data suggests 67 percent of 
leftist groups last a year or less, whereas 61 percent of ethnic groups and 55 percent of 
religious groups end so quickly. In the Gaibulloev and Sandler data, while 30 percent of 
left-wing groups end in their first year, only 27 and 21 percent of ethnic and religious 
groups do so. The Phillips data suggests a sharper difference, where 33 percent of leftist 
groups do not last longer than a year, while the numbers are 12 percent for ethnic groups 
and 17 percent for religious groups. 
The data suggest ethnic groups are somewhat more durable than left-wing groups, 
but in three of the four data sets the difference is small. In all the data sets, religious groups 
are less likely to end in the first year than left-wing groups are, consistent with Rapoport’s 
argument. Interestingly, right-wing group are also especially unlikely to cease to exist in 
their first year. This is not a part of Rapoport’s wave theory, and right-wing groups are a 
fairly rare type of group, but more research into the apparent longevity of right-wing groups 
could be fruitful.27  
These descriptive-data trends are consistent with other analysis. Quantitative 
multivariate analysis results are mixed, but some studies find that ethnonationalist 
motivations are associated with group longevity.28 Other quantitative studies find religious 
groups are especially long-lasting.29 Overall, there is no support for the idea that 90 percent 
of leftist groups failed before their first birthday. However, consistent with Rapoport’s 
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arguments, there is some support for the idea that left-wing groups are not especially 
resilient, while religious and ethnic groups are.  
 
Conclusion 
 Rapoport’s estimate that perhaps 90 percent of terrorist groups survive less than a 
year has drawn attention to an important subject, terrorist group longevity, and more 
generally to organizational dynamics of terrorism. It has provided impetus to theoretical 
and empirical work on the subject, and has contributed to the inspiration for major data-
gathering projects on terrorist organizations. It is fitting, then, that these major data 
collections are used to evaluate the conventional wisdom about terrorist group longevity. 
 Analysis of the eight most expansive global data sets of terrorist organization 
longevity suggests that terrorist groups are more durable than commonly thought. While 
prominent terrorism studies repeat the claim that 90 percent of terrorist groups last less than 
a year, it turns out that perhaps about 50 percent of terrorist groups are so short-lived. This 
broad range of first-year failure rates across data sets is indicative of challenges in 
obtaining data about clandestine organizations, and how researchers can come to different 
conclusions even using similar data sources. However, it is remarkable that the statistics are 
all considerably below 90 percent.  
 Given that terrorist groups are apparently more durable than we had believed, this 
carries implications for research on terrorist organizations. The population of terrorist 
groups is not only a handful of unusually durable groups, and the rest that last less than a 
year. Case studies of terrorist organizations tend to focus on the extremely durable groups 
that have lasted decades. However, we probably ought to learn more about the other 
terrorist groups, which tend to carry out attacks for a few years, if not 10 or 15.  
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The apparent gap between the conventional wisdom and the data suggests the 
importance of complementing theoretical work with additional empirical analysis. For 
example, researchers continue to test Bloom’s outbidding argument as new data becomes 
available.30 Testing the limits of arguments, and the conditions under which arguments 
hold, is an important part of building a more cohesive body of terrorism research. It is also 
consistent with calls to bring more data analysis, even descriptive data, into terrorism 
studies.31 There are debates about the relative merits of theory generation vs. hypothesis 









































Study Description of sample Source(s) Percent of groups 
that survive 1 
year or less 
Jones and Libicki 
2008 
648 groups. Global, 1968-
2006 
RAND 25% 
Vittori 2009 100 groups. A random sample 
of 897. Global, 1968-2007. 
RAND 59% 
Blomberg et al. 
2010 
1,414 groups. Global, but only 
groups with transnational 
attacks. 1968-2007. 
ITERATE 67% 


















2,223 groups. Global, 1970-
2010. 
GTD 68% 
Miller 2016 2,437 groups. Global. 1970-
2013 
GTD 71% 
Average of data 
sets 
  52% 
	 15 
Figure 1. First-year failure rate by group motivation in different data sets 
 
Note: Only studies with information on group motivation for all groups are included. 
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